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Abstract 
There is evidence that many contemporary financial firms are untrustworthy, relative to other 
professions and to the past.  We seek a partial explanation in the overuse of incentive contracts, 
and an implicit moral training for professionals which misuses cost-benefit analysis for matters 
of integrity. The most straightforward representation of Economic Man chooses an ‘optimal’ 
amount of deceit (moral optimization), in spite of experimental evidence that some agents rule 
out untruthfulness a priori (moral prioritization). We suggest that the restoration of 
trustworthiness may be aided by less reliance on incentive contracts and less use of cost-benefit 
analyses for matters of integrity.   
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1 Introduction 
Trust and trustworthiness are fundamental to economic welfare. They explain why most people 
are honest when making social security claims and why restaurants are happy to serve first and 
charge afterwards (Bacharach et al. 2007). It also explains why unmonitored efforts are 
rewarded on an hourly basis in so many workplaces, when neoclassical economic theory might 
suggest otherwise (Jensen and Meckling 1976). Furthermore, professionals of all kinds are 
sought out not just for their expertise, but for an assumed trustworthiness with respect to their 
clients (Downie 1990).  
Banking is one industry where trust and trustworthiness are particularly important.2 Banks 
collect detailed information on contracts and products as they interact with savers, debtors, 
investors and companies. Due to their expertise and access to private information, bank 
managers have power over shareholders and customers, and therefore a social responsibility to 
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be trustworthy. As an indication of the centrality of trust to banking, the origin of the word 
‘credit’ is the Latin credere: to believe, to trust.  
Yet there is evidence that many contemporary financial firms are untrustworthy. A US Senate 
Inquiry into the 2008/9 Global Financial Crisis was critical of Goldman Sachs.  
‘You are taking a position against the very security that you are selling and you are 
not troubled? … And you want people to trust you? Why would people trust you?’ 
Senator Carl Levin, to Goldman Sachs CEO (quoted in US Senate 2010)  
A decade later, the 2017-2019 Australian Royal Commission into Misconduct in the Banking, 
Superannuation and Financial Services Industry has also exposed instances of 
untrustworthiness. One testimony relates how a client had paid fees to construct a financial 
plan based around living in an investment property. She felt misled, because this is not 
permissible under Australian law:  
‘I just feel now after all the time after all the fees and insurances … that all along they 
were just aiming for us to take out an investment property that you can’t live in. I just 
felt after that, [pause] that we had been led up the garden path and had been lied to.’   
Jacqueline McDowall (quoted in Danckert 2018) 
Senate inquiries and royal commissions are subject to adverse selection, since only the most 
questionable behaviour is selected for media exposure and courtroom scrutiny. However, there 
is experimental evidence which raises concerns too. In Cohn et al. (2014), 128 bank employees 
from a large international bank were given a coin flipping task and rewarded for the outcomes 
they reported. Subjects were given $20 for each ‘correct’ toss out of ten tosses, giving a range 
of payoffs from zero (no correct tosses) to $200 (ten correct tosses). The subjects knew which 
tosses would be deemed correct in advance. Prior to the coin task, the control group of bankers 
was asked about the use of their leisure time and their hobbies, priming them to think in terms 
of their domestic identity. The treatment group of bankers was asked about their work life, 
priming them with their professional identity. 
The experimental subjects flipped the coin out of sight, mirroring hidden action by the agent 
in the classic Principal-Agent setup (Jensen and Meckling 1976). No individual deceit could 
be detected, but group cheating was detectable when the results were compared with the 
binomial distribution of payoffs, which are bell-shaped for truthful disclosure (Figure 1). The 





Figure 1: The untrustworthiness of bankers 
 
In figure 1, ‘a’ is the control group and ‘b’ is the treatment group. The dark binomial 
distribution bars represent the expected frequencies of payoffs if all tosses are reported 
truthfully, and the light bars are the findings. When primed to think of their professional 
identity, the bankers as a group reported on average too many financially rewarding tosses. But 
they were generally honest when focused on their domestic identity.3  
Yet when the experiment was repeated with other employment categories, including 
manufacturing, pharmaceuticals, telecommunications and information technology, no 
significant increase in dishonesty in the professional identity treatment was identified. We are 
not so naïve as to think that other professionals cannot ever lie, but we instead take this 
experiment as evidence that bankers have a trustworthiness problem relative to their peers in 
other professions.   
Furthermore, bankers appear to have a relative trustworthiness problem when compared to the 
past, at least in the UK.4  In some ways this is a hopeful observation. Different behaviour in the past 
suggests that a restoration to previous levels of trustworthiness is an evidence-based aspiration (for the 
UK see Haldane et al. 2011, Jaffer et al. 2014, Martin 2016, Mayer 2013, Morris and Vines 2014, Offer 
2014, The Economist 2017, Turner 2010, Woolley 2010). 
It is not uncommon to make a general claim that contemporary financial firms are 
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untrustworthy relative to other professions and to the past, and to hope for change. However, 
in this paper we wish to be more specific than this. By highlighting two particular reasons why 
untrustworthiness might be prevalent we are then able to recommend corresponding strategies 
to help restore trustworthiness to levels attained in other professions and in the past.  
One potential reason is that finance is a profession that is ‘all about money’ and so the literature 
on money priming has potential relevance (Vohs 2015). For example, Belk and Wallendorf 
(1990) claim that money in contemporary society is (pg. 36) ‘revered, feared, worshipped, and 
treated with the highest respect’, and it is not difficult to imagine negative effects on motivation 
that might arise. For example, in Oliver Stone’s 1987 film Wall Street the anti-hero, Gordon 
Gekko, is a ruthless corporate raider who delivers the phrase ‘greed is good’ in a much 
down-loaded excerpt.5  
Whatever plausibility this has, however, we are unable to pursue it in this paper because we 
are hampered by a lack of evidence. Studies showing money priming effects, where money is 
introduced in an incidental way in an experimental environment rather than as an incentive, are 
embroiled in the replication crisis. It is too early to tell if any money priming effects will survive 
scrutiny (Klein et al. 2014, Roher et al. 2015 and especially Vadillo et al. 2016). 
The related motivation crowding out literature is unscathed by the replication crisis, and it 
suggests that money has the effect of attenuating moral motivations when it appears as an 
incentive. A classic motivation crowding out example is the study of six day-care centres in 
Haifa (Gneezy and Rustichini 2000). On the introduction of a fine for parents who were late in 
picking up their children, the surprising result was that the incidence of lateness increased, 
more than doubling. Financial incentives had the apparent effect of transforming late-arrival 
from one kind of moral entity to another – from a morally reprehensible violation of a principle 
to a decision problem to be solved with cost-benefit analysis.  
Financial incentives are widely applied in banking, so this is relevant for the prevalence of trust 
and trustworthiness. Based on the evidence for motivation crowding out, we suggest that there 
may have been an overuse of financial incentives. It follows that using them less may help 
restore trust.  
A third explanation focusses on the type of training participants receive, either prior to entry in 
a university degree or through professional study (such as an MBA). Successful banking 
                                                          





requires that both loans and insurance contracts be monitored in the light of evolving conditions 
that operate at the firm level and at the level of the general business environment – the domains 
of microeconomics and macroeconomics. Important banking positions are therefore occupied 
by those with an economics training, and there is a body of evidence suggesting that economists 
lack pro-social preferences (Bauman and Rose 2011, Cipriani et al. 2009, Frank et al. 1993, 
Frank and Schultze 2000, Frey and Meier 2003). Some work in this literature controls for 
problems of adverse selection, whereby certain types choose to study economics, and 
concludes that both adverse selection and training contribute to the measured preferences of 
economists.  
We do not pursue an adverse selection explanation in this paper. The free market liberalism 
system can function with a modicum of good motives both in the domains of optimal allocation 
(Arrow and Debreu 1954, Smith 1759 and 1776) and information processing (Hayek 1945), so 
it is not clear how much adverse selection will matter in the finance industry. Indeed, we think 
it likely that people who choose training in manufacturing, pharmaceuticals, 
telecommunications and information technology are more profit-driven than, say, nurses, but 
the adverse selection operating in these instances was not enough to show up as 
untrustworthiness for these professions in Cohen et al. (2014), or to show up historically in 
scandals of a banking-scale proportions with banking-scale frequency. Thus, while we suspect 
some adverse selection is in operation, we lack evidence about its importance relative to other 
professions. 
Instead, we explore a training effect recently highlighted by the original popularizer of the 
Principal-Agent framework (Jensen and Meckling 1976). 
‘This is a great failure of the curriculum of every business school I know: we teach our 
students the importance of conducting a cost/benefit analysis in everything they do. In most 
cases, this is useful – but not when it comes to behaving with integrity. In fact, treating 
integrity …as a matter of cost/benefit analysis virtually guarantees that you will not be a 
person of integrity.’                   (Jensen, 2014, page 18)  
The implication is that teaching business students to model ethical choices using cost benefit 
analysis amounts to a very specific moral training, with a learning objective that optimality is 
always desirable.6 Jensen suggests that this a normative ‘great failure’, but the work of Erat 
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and Gneezy (2010) goes further, suggesting that this modelling might even may fail positively 
as a generalization of ‘the way things actually are’. They find that a significant proportion of 
agents tell the truth as a matter of principle, even when it hurts everyone, including themselves.  
In this paper call the use of cost-benefit analysis in moral environments moral optimization, 
and we outline an alternative account, called moral prioritization, where a moral principle 
overrides utility maximization. Jensen’s comments above align him to Sen (1977), who argues 
that sometimes commitments can and should override utility maximization. Thus, what we call 
moral prioritization is a Sen-style commitment to moral principle.  
The paper is structured as follows. In section 2 we formalize Jensen’s (2014) perspective by 
distinguishing moral optimization from moral prioritization. In section 3 we show the 
transformational significance of this for Jensen’s own Principal-Agent framework. If moral 
prioritization is feasible, Jensen and Meckling (1976) becomes a means of measuring the cost 
of adopting a second-best incentive contract when the first-best full-information contract is 
feasible, rather than a prescription to always use incentive contracts when there is hidden 
action. In section 4 we rely on the motivation crowding out literature to suggest that financial 
incentives can be harmful. It follows from sections 3 and 4 that a reduced reliance on incentive 
contracts would yield a double dividend of promoting efficiency (if truth-telling could be relied 
upon) and restricting the undesirable effects of motivation crowding out. We also refer in 
section 4 to the literature which suggests that an economics training might crowd out pro-social 
motives, echoing Jensen’s (2014) point. In section 5 we discuss how practical it is to restore 
trust in finance to levels attained in the past or in other professions. As well as a reduced 
reliance on incentive contracts, there is some scope for altering professional norms in the 
workplace, and reforming economics training in such a way that students are exposed to other 
representative agents alongside Economic Man. However, we are not utopian – our discussion 
is about the restoration of finance, not its transformation.  
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2 Moral Optimization and Moral Prioritization 
In this section we focus on the nature of trustworthiness required to restore finance. 
Trustworthiness involves many things: competence, reliability, promise keeping and 
truth-telling, to name a few. Arguably a lapse in any of these might be important, but we focus 
on truth-telling because two important economic effects flow from lying: It exposes customers 
to fraud by bankers who understand financial products better than they do, and (as explained 
in the next section) it forces shareholders to relate to managers according to the Principal-Agent 
model, so that socially inefficient incentive contracts must be offered to bank managers who 
cannot be trusted to give a reliable account of their activities. 
Central to the idea of trustworthiness is the notion that someone’s commitment can be relied 
upon, even if it ceases to be in their interests, or the interests of those they care about. When 
that is applied to lying, a trustworthy person will tell the truth even if, as Jensen (2014) might 
put it, lying passes a cost benefit analysis.  
 
Ordinary common-sense morality recognizes this phenomenon of trustworthiness. It treats the 
mandate to speak truthfully as an obligation which is qualified or weakened only in unusual 
and exceptional circumstances. The strength of the obligation to speak truthfully is not sensitive 
to the standard costs and benefits that lying or deceit may bring; indeed, it is precisely because 
there are such benefits, that they are costly to others to bear, and that moral disapproval is our 
main defence against opportunistic liars, that the moral disapprobation that falls on the liar is 
so strong. Common-sense morality contrasts with utilitarianism, however, which countenances 
lying if the consequences of a lie are sufficiently beneficial that it outweighs the costs.  
 
We have already mentioned our experimental warrant to take the phenomenon of common-
sense morality seriously. Erat and Gneezy (2010) provide a clean test for ‘lie aversion’.  Their 
experiment is noteworthy because they allowed subjects to improve everyone’s financial 
payoff by telling an untruth, which they called a Pareto White Lie.7 The mainstream economic 
solution is straightforwardly determined in this situation because:  
‘The utilitarian approach [moral optimization] … argues that one should lie in such situations. 
… a person should weight benefits against harm and happiness against unhappiness. The act 
of lying in itself carries no bad consequences.’                                                   (2010, pg. 724) 
                                                          





In their experiment around one third (36/102) of subjects refrained from lying when given the 
opportunity to pull off a substantially and mutually-rewarding Pareto White Lie.   
With this evidence in mind we create a distinction between what we call moral optimization 
and moral prioritization.  Moral optimization is the modelling of ethical behaviour using 
standard preference-satisfaction techniques, where the content of preferences includes a regard 
for others to a greater or lesser extent (Collard 1978, Becker 1981, Hausman 2012). In contrast, 
moral prioritization rejects the framework of preference satisfaction when modelling some 
ethical acts, allowing profit- and utility-maximizing to be overridden (Williams 1973, Sen 
1977). The essence of moral optimization is balancing one’s own interests against another’s 
using cost benefit analysis. The essence of moral prioritization is over-riding this balancing of 
interests.  
So, to follow through with the example of truth-telling, a cost benefit analysis (moral 
optimization) recommends an optimal amount of deceit, if the benefits to me, or those I love, 
are high enough. But decisions about lying need not be made in this manner. Individuals might 
act according to the principle: ‘You should not lie!’ as one third of Erat and Gneezy’s (2010) 
subject pool appeared to do. For such individuals the principle trumps evaluation of costs and 
benefits. The fact that some people do not act according to the moral principle does not count 
against the phenomenon that many do. Moral prioritization is a principled eschewing of cost 
benefit analysis, even when its components include shared interests and empathy.   
On a theoretical level, Sen (1977) laid the groundwork for legitimizing moral prioritization 
within mainstream economic theory by suggesting that preference satisfaction tries to do too 
many things.  
‘A person is given one preference ordering, and as and when the need arises this is supposed 
to reflect his interests, represent his welfare, summarize his idea of what should be done, and 
describe his actual choices and behaviour. Can one preference ordering do all these things? 
A person thus described may be “rational” in the limited sense of revealing no inconsistencies 
in his choice behaviour, but if he has no use for these distinctions between quite different 
concepts, he must be a bit of a fool.’       (Sen 1977, pp. 335-336, original italics) 
Engelen (2017) is one example of someone who, having rejected the proposition that 
preference satisfaction models cover all behaviour, turns to what Sen (1977) calls commitment 





However, Sen’s suggestion has been resisted. Hausman (2012) defends preference orderings 
as a universal modelling device, although concedes that there are instances where most 
economists uses moral prioritization in their models. He gives the example of maximizing 
utility with a fixed amount of money, noting that the budget constraint cannot be expanded by 
stealing irrespective of how much it might satisfy preferences.  
Consider figure 2A, which is a standard undergraduate diagram of utility maximization. A 
consumer has a budget set determined by their income, and they maximize utility subject to 
this set. As shown by the arrow, the consumer has income taken away from her, where the 
budget sets for income are solid, and must suffer a decline of utility as a result. Hausman points 
out that what is missing in a standard undergraduate diagram like 2A, but is included in 2B, is 
a parameterization of theft. The optimal amount of theft could be calculated and it provides a 
cushion for utility reduction. Clearly, theft would increase as utility falls.  
Figure 2A: Undergraduate Diagram  
(reduced utility from lower income) 
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Figure 2B: Optimal theft  
(dashed budget set includes receipts from theft) 
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The widespread use of 2A in textbooks (and journal articles) rather than 2B is a formal 
recognition of what has been noted at least since Adam Smith (1759), that certain ethical norms 
are necessary for a well-functioning market system. We might optimize over many choice 
variables in a problem but the bedrock norms – such as no stealing in figure 2A – are not 
subjected to the principle of optimality.  
Anderson (2001) joins in the debate between Sen and Hausman and makes the methodological 
point that whilst it may be possible to describe ethics in terms of preference satisfaction, it may 
not be the best procedure. In her view, the generation of other competing analytic tools is a 





this matter,  we follow her approach by accepting the validity of both moral optimization and 
moral prioritization as potential tools in order to model ethical choices.  
Thus, we are not ruling out moral optimization (and hence using cost benefit analysis for ethical 
issues). Mainstream economic modelling has found moral optimization to be a very useful tool. 
Becker (1981) showed that moral optimization is easy to append to standard economic models, 
and this goes some way to explaining its popularity. Typically, the welfare of others is added 
into preferences (or a ‘utility function’) as just another ‘good’ and standard analysis can then 
proceed.  
This approach seems especially reasonable when the nature of the ethical choice involves two 
things that are intrinsically good. In Becker (1981), an agent is deciding how much of a resource 
pool to access for themselves and how much to give to family members. In many plausible 
situations both actions could be described as ethical, so the idea of balancing considerations at 
the margin – i.e. compromising – seems both true to how people actually behave, and to how 
they should behave. In finance, by extension, one might imagine a professional deciding how 
much to charge a client. The difference between the maximum the client will pay and a 
scheduled fee defines a surplus. If the professional has the power to unilaterally decide what 
they charge the client they may well charge less than the maximum, depending on their regard 
for the client’s feelings and financial circumstances. All this is amenable to preference-
satisfaction modelling – what we have called moral optimization. 
However, not all ethical considerations fall neatly into this framework. There are certain 
bedrock values for which ‘optimal’ violations seem ethically nonsensical, just like optimal 
stealing seemed out of place in figure 2B. We might note that, at least in OECD countries, the 
notion of an ‘optimal amount of workplace violence’ is not something that is easy to say, let 
alone implement. Indeed, even if a manager decided that the optimal amount of workplace 
violence were zero, the very act of optimizing this choice variable would be regarded as a 
morally reprehensible act.  
‘Entertaining certain alternatives, regarding them indeed as alternatives, is itself something 
that [the moral individual] regards as dishonourable or morally absurd’  
(Williams 1973, pg. 92). 
William’s comment is also helpful for understanding how moral prioritization differs from a 
more sophisticated moral optimization that properly incorporates externalities. Even if the fully 





would still claim that the calculation itself was unethical, regardless of the outcome. In other 
words, ‘means’ matter as much as ‘ends’.  Naturally, Hausman, who believes everything can 
be described in preferences, would take the opposite side in this ongoing debate.8  
What might finance look like if the optimal amount of deceit aroused the same moral 
indignation as the optimal amount of theft, or the optimal amount of workplace violence? 
Erhard and Jensen (1998) claim that deceit among corporate management is sometimes hidden 
through redescription. They have their own terminology for trustworthiness, and in the 
following quote having ‘Word-4 integrity’ is being someone for whom ‘what you say is so’.  
‘In everyday language violating Word-4 is “lying”. When we use terms other than lying to 
describe a violation of Word-4 we inadvertently encourage the sacrifice of integrity. We 
have observed perfectly honest upstanding people in their roles as board members condone 
manipulation of financial reports because it does not occur to them as lying—it occurs to 
them as just part of what it means to ... “manage earnings”.’ 
                                                                                       (Erhard and Jensen 1998, page 17) 
 As in Jensen (2014), the authors are claiming that truth-telling should be a bedrock value in 
finance, not subject to optimality. In our terminology, truth-telling in finance should be an 
instance of moral prioritization rather than moral optimization.  
3 Moral Prioritization and the Principal Agent Model 
In this section we show the transformational significance of Jensen’s (2014) quote for his own 
Principal-Agent framework (Jensen and Meckling 1976). Put simply, trustworthy 
communication implies that hidden action becomes discoverable. That is, the principal simply 
asks the agent, who then tells the truth. If the agent is trustworthy, the first-best solution 
becomes attainable, and the meaning of Jensen and Meckling (1976) is changed. It becomes a 
means of measuring the cost of adopting a second-best incentive contract when the first best is 
feasible, rather than a prescription to always use incentive contracts when there is hidden 
action. That is, if more truth-telling is really attainable through better training, as Jensen 
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implies, then Jensen (2014) should override Jensen and Meckling (1976) in finance, on 
efficiency grounds alone. 
We now illustrate this using a standard textbook exposition of the Principal Agent model 
(Milgrom and Roberts 1992, appendix to chapter 6 Moral Hazard and Performance 
Incentives). We make some cosmetic changes to their notation, but the setup is identical.  
In Table 1 the principal hires an agent and relies on the effort e of the agent to generate revenues 
R for the principal. Effort is either high (e=2) or low (e=1) and high effort makes high revenues 
more likely as follows (Milgrom and Roberts, 1992, Table 6.5, pg. 201): 
Table 1: Probability of Revenues for Different Levels of Effort 
 Revenue 
Effort level Low R=10 High R=30 
e=2 (high) Prob=1/3 Prob=2/3 
e=1 (low) Prob=2/3 Prob=1/3 
 
We assume the principal pays a lower case wage, w, to the agent when R=10 and an upper case 
wage, W, when R=30. If w=W the agent receives a constant wage un-incentivized by outcomes. 
Milgrom and Roberts assume agent satisfaction is a concave transformation of the wage, net 
of effort cost, )1(  ewage . The concavity is a device to ensure the agent dislikes risk.  
The agent can earn a wage for another company with satisfaction equal to unity (for simplicity). 
In order to guarantee the agent’s participation the principal must offer satisfaction at least equal 
to this outside option. Principal satisfaction is expected profits, defined as expected revenues 
minus the expected wage: E()=E(R-wage). 
There are two optimal contracts. Contract O applies when effort is Observable.  The principal 
offers the agent a steady wage of W=w=4 if a high effort is forthcoming, and nothing otherwise. 
The agent sets e=2 and E()=70/3-12/3=58/3. Agent satisfaction is
1)12(4)1(  ewage , as required. 
Contract H applies when effort is Hidden (and, implicitly, when agents cannot be relied upon 
to disclose it when asked). The solution involves meeting two constraints at minimum cost to 
the principal. The Participation constraint says that agent must be paid enough such that the 
expected satisfaction from participating exceeds what is available elsewhere, namely
    11)(2W/3.21)(2w/3.1  . The Incentive Compatibility constraint says that a high 





only exceed unity, as in the Participation constraint, but also that it must exceed what is 
available when e=1 namely    1)(1W/3.11)(1w/3.2  .  
The participation and incentive compatibility inequalities simplify to w0.53W  and 
w3W   respectively in Figure 3. The vertical axis shows the square root of the wage 
when R is high, namely W , and the horizontal axis shows the square root of the wage when 
R is low, namely w . Using square roots means that the two constraints can be drawn as straight 
lines in figure 3. The Incentive Compatibility constraint is shown by the shaded area, and the 
participation constraint holds anywhere above the bold diagonal. Both constraints overlap and 
are therefore satisfied in the shaded area, but the point of minimum cost to the principal is H - 
the bottom tip of this area where W=32=9 and w=0.  
The solutions O and H are shown by the triple ([√w, √W], E() where the first two terms 
locate the point on Figure 2, and the (bold) expected profits determines the social desirability 
of the contract. 
Figure 3: Wage Contract and Profits  
for Hidden Action and Observable Action 
(Figure 6.1, Milgrom and Roberts, 1992; Payoffs ([√W, √w)) 
 
√W        Incentive Constraint √W ≥ 3+√w 
5 
4      
3         H ([3, 0], 52/3)             
2    O ([2, 2], 58/3)   or   Untruthful ([2, 2], 44/3) 
1                              Participation Constraint √W ≥ 3-0.5√w 
           √w 
              1      2     3     4     5     6 
Milgrom and Roberts show the adjusted wage is equally satisfying in both H and O, and we 
refer the reader there for details. Since the agent is equally well off in both scenarios, the 
difference in expected profits, namely 58/3 – 52/3, is the difference in social welfare. 
We now show an additional point U, which is not in Milgrom and Roberts (1992). U stands for 
‘Untruthful’ and it represents the outcome of a principal offering an agent a fixed wage contract 





e=2 but does e=1. The agent can lie because the revenue outcome in table 1 is stochastic and 
so they can blame low revenue on bad luck. We assume the principal has to pay the agent in 
this case so that a lying strategy is clearly optimal for a maximizing agent in a one-shot game 
if the agent is offered contract O. Choosing effort level e=1 gives assured payoff )1(  ewage
=2 since the agent is offered a wage of 4. The outcome for the principal is compromised by the 
agent’s lie, giving E()=E(R-wage)=44/3. If the principal knows the agent type, it is clearly 
suboptimal to offer such a contract to an untruthful maximizing agent. It is socially sub-optimal 
too: the difference between first best profits versus profits at U are 58/3-44/3=14/3 and the 
extra gain for the agent (1 extra wage unit) leaves society with a welfare loss: 1-14/3 = -11/3   
However, if truth-telling is feasible because the agent follows the moral sentiment of the Jensen 
(2014) rather than the Jensen and Meckling (1976), the economic analysis of the Principal-
Agent problem serves a different purpose. Instead of advocating incentive contracts, as would 
be the case if unobservable action implied undiscoverable action, we now interpret the 
difference in social welfare 58/3–52/3 as the loss arising from failing to use feasible truth-
telling in this economic environment. If truth-telling is not feasible 58/3–52/3 becomes the cost 
of untruthfulness.  
Agent truthfulness in this framework is a violation of individual rationality, because any agent 
styled like Economic Man will accept the equal wage contract, W=w=4 in exchange for high 
effort, put in low effort, but then lie by claiming the effort level was high. However, it is the 
nature of moral prioritization to over-ride maximizing behaviour, and we here remind the 
reader of the evidence of Erat and Gneezy’s (2010) which is relevant for a trustworthy agent.  
The formal model is helpful to see precisely how the contracts are transformed by trustworthy 
truth-telling, but we do not want the maths to obscure the point, which can be made very 
simply: We have shown in this section that a trustworthy agent subverts the presumption that 
what is unobservable is undiscoverable, allowing the first best to be attained.  
Overriding individual rationality is an uncommon modelling choice within economics, though, 
as we noted above, optimal stealing is generally ruled out of consumer theory. However, in 
other professions like medicine, this overriding is assumed to be possible, so that we rely on 
truthfulness when we ask our doctor a question (Downie 1990). The relevant norm of 
truthfulness here is of moral prioritization, which over-rides individual rationality, rather than 
moral optimization. We would be unwise to consult a doctor who practiced optimal deceit, 





In the same way, the principal in the Principal-Agent problem cannot rely on an agent telling 
them about hidden action in a workplace if the agent practices optimal deceit. However, if the 
principal knows the agent practices moral prioritization with respect to truth telling, there is an 
escape from Jensen and Meckling’s (1976) inefficient incentive contracts. 
4 Motivation Crowding Out in Finance 
Frey (1997) defines motivation crowding out as the process whereby external (extrinsic) 
stimuli remove good internal (intrinsic) motivations. It is common to use motivation crowding 
out to explain how financial incentives affect work effort. Here, however, the focus is on how 
the external stimuli of financial incentives and economics training effect the intrinsic desire to 
tell the truth.  
Motivation crowding out arising from financial incentives provides an explanation of why 
bankers at work show a permissive attitude to moral requirements like telling the truth (Cohn 
et al. 2014). Bonus-based pay culture could undermine bankers’ moral motivations, leading 
them to act on the basis of material self-interest, constrained at best by the letter of the law. 
Bonuses could potentially frame banking as conducted only for money, by signaling that their 
job is only to maximize profit. Moral considerations on how to act, including around 
obligations to tell the truth to clients and shareholders, are implicitly downgraded.  
Another possible mechanism corrosive to trust is that bonuses communicate that ‘we do not 
trust managers’. The erosion of social preferences here would take the form of the experimental 
phenomenon of ‘trust responsiveness’ (Bacharach et al. 2007) whereby the communication of 
a lack of trust from party A to party B leads to party B actually becoming less trustworthy – a 
proverbial ‘self-fulfilling prophecy’. 
A third concern about bonuses comes from a former Chief Economist of one of Australia’s 
‘Big Four’ banks. His claim, which is new to the literature as far as we are aware, is that 
subjectively apportioned bonuses create an unhealthy dependency between the manager and 
the recipient, where the recipient is rewarded for mimicking the values of the manager, rapidly 
disseminating a new culture.  
‘Bonuses not tied to formal outcomes but to the approval of the manager charged with 
dispersing them, have a largely unrecognised power to change culture quickly. I believe this 
was a factor in changing the culture of bankers from 1995 to 2010, reinforcing the influence 





Whatever the particular source, Hogan is critical about the impact of motivation crowding out 
in Australian finance, as it increasingly mimicked global banking culture over 1995 to 2010.  
‘From 1995 to 2010, there was an increase in the flow of foreign professionals into the big 
4 banks either from overseas, or by Australians with international banking experience. 
Based on my observation of the market, and dealing with counterparties, this lead to a 
cultural change in banking, where it [became] all about the money with a focus on short 
term profitability.’                                         (Hogan, op. cit.) 
There is now a significant body of international evidence to warrant concern about motivation 
crowding out. An early contribution was due to Titmuss (1970), who eloquently argued that 
financial incentives can evacuate intrinsic motivation, much like the aforementioned day-care 
example where a fine increased late coming (Gneezy and Rustichini 2000). Titmuss compared 
the UK blood donation system, which relied on voluntary contributions, with the US for-profit 
system, and showed how a non-market system based on altruism can be more effective.  
For a long time, these effects were regarded as curiosities by economists, and with the 
exception of Collard (1978) there was little attempt to incorporate them into mainstream theory. 
However, by the close of the last century a substantial body of experimental evidence pointed 
to the fact that financial incentives could crowd out, and even crowd in, good motivations (Frey 
1997). On balance, however, crowding out is more often observed in experiments (see Bowles 
and Polania-Reyes 2012 for an extensive review and Bowles 2016 for a popular discussion).9  
Thus, less reliance on incentive contracts could yield a double dividend. Such a strategy would 
not only promote efficiency if agents were trustworthy (as outlined in section 3 above), but 
also restrict the undesirable effects of motivation crowding out.  
While bonuses are one extrinsic stimulus that can cause motivation crowding out, another is 
the kind of economics training received. We have already flagged the misuse of cost-benefit 
analysis is section 2 as a potential problem, but the impact of the economics training is wider 
than this. 
The latter decades of the twentieth century where noteworthy for the pro-market cultural tides 
                                                          
9 An example of crowding in is given by Bowles (2016). In variants of the public goods game with punishments, 
all agents have to reveal their contributions. In some cultures, low contributions invoke punishment by fellow 
players, and this acts to hold up the contributions of everyone (in other cultures, however, punishments meet 





that reached their high-water mark during the Reagan/Thatcher era.10 Their conception of 
economics placed a good deal of reliance on Adam Smith’s ‘invisible hand’ metaphor, 
reiterated and developed by Arrow and Debreu (1954) and Hayek (1945) and popularized by 
Milton Friedman. Reliance on the metaphor, mediated through an increasingly insular 
economics training,11 provided some with a rationalization – a strategy for reducing cognitive 
dissonance by adapting belief to desire (Elster (1983: 123, 156)) – for a particularly narrow 
vision for the economy. Important qualifications to the invisible hand, such as problems 
associated with public goods and externalities, where not highlighted.  
The assumptions of Economic Man arguably developed into a moral norm with a weak sense 
of social responsibility, sometimes even lacking a conception of society itself.12 It involved 
agents maximizing their financial wealth (Mill 1974/1843) or happiness (Bentham 1948/1789) 
and the paramount importance of ‘preference satisfaction’. The conflation of orderings, 
self-interest and welfare (Sen 1977) creating serious terminological confusion, hampering the 
discussion of ethics within economics.13 On a practical level, the upshot of this kind of 
economics training favored a pragmatic approach to ethical challenges, seeing them as 
problems to be solved with cost-benefit analysis, implicitly leading to an ‘optimal amount’ of 
wrong-doing. 
The impact of this on business schools, management and global finance culture can be seen by 
considering the cultural transformation of the leading US business schools in the closing 
decades of the twentieth century.14 Partly under the influence of Professor Michael Jensen, 
whom we have come across a number of times in this paper, a generation of students were 
                                                          
10 The most common term for this is neo-liberalism, but this is sometimes used pejoratively and we want merely 
to describe the orientation to markets, rather than judge them. 
11 There is some evidence that economists are less likely to cite outside their field compared with other scholars. 
Fully 81% of economists’ citations are drawn from within their discipline, as against 52% for sociology, 53% 
for anthropology, and 59% for political science (Fourcade et al. 2015). 
12 Lydenberg (2014) contrasts the ‘rational person’ of economics (economic man), whom he says pursues his 
own personal ends, with the ‘reasonable person’ of tort law who is defined ‘in terms of the interests of oneself in 
relationship to society’s interests and the interests of others in that society’ (op cit., pg. 288).  Mrs Thatcher is 
famously quoted as saying ‘… who is society? There is no such thing! There are individual men and women…’ 
(Woman’s Own 1987), although in fairness to her she claims that life is ‘reciprocal’ soon after in the same 
interview.  
13The same lack of clarity affects the term ‘utilitarianism’ which was the historical precursor to preference 
satisfaction. As discussed in Collard (1978) Mill – the creator of economic man –recognized that utilitarianism 
was both used as an explanation for the behaviour of essentially selfish individuals, or as a moral vision which 
enjoins impartiality. Collard suggests that Mill believed, in a vague way, that education and social progress 
would close the gap between the two usages (Collard 1978, pg. 58).  One hundred and fifty years hence, the gap 
remains, with the same word ‘utilitarianism’ uncomfortably stretched across it.  
14 The insights about US business schools are from Professor K. Ramanna, Blavatnik School of Government, 
University of Oxford, formerly of Harvard Business School, and I am grateful for him sharing a draft 





steered away from a stakeholder view of firm management towards one based on single-minded 
profit maximization assisted with Jensen's Principal-Agent contracts. (Khurana 2007). 
Although Jensen asserted his models of firms were descriptive, his more popular writings (such 
as Jensen and Murphy 1990) promoted his contracts as good managerial practice in a normative 
sense, giving imprimatur to both the relentless profit-maximizing self-interest of the principal, 
and the agents who are unable to truthfully communicate.  
Thus Adam’s Smith’s invisible hand ceased being a statement about how markets can work 
with a range of motivation exogenously given, and became instead a prescription that firms 
and managers should abandon a stakeholder view so as to align themselves to a self-interested 
competitive benchmark.  
It is hardly surprising that economics training would be affected by these developments. On 
the ‘supply side’ the models produced in journals had been transformed by Jensen and 
Meckling (1976), and on the ‘demand side’ student were being sent out into a world of Jensen’s 
imagining. Naturally, curricula had to adjust. 
Evidence for motivation crowding out from economics training is found Frank et al. (1993). 
They survey a series of experiments with economics and non-economics undergraduates: a 
public goods game; prisoners’ dilemma; Ultimatum game, and an honesty test. On each, 
economists are less likely than a general sample to interact cooperatively. Corroborating studies 
include Frank and Schulze (2000) and Frey and Meier (2003). The finding is sufficiently robust 
that a subordinate literature addresses the question of the causal direction of the correlation: 
does economics training make people selfish, or do selfish people choose to train in economics? 
The verdict is: both (see Cipriani et al 2009, Bauman and Rose 2011).  
It would be interesting to know how Jensen might have incorporated his post-1990s views into 
the 1970s Principal-agent model. The culture of professionalism (Downie 1990), and now 
Jensen himself, must believe that truth-telling is possible, for otherwise there would be no point 
in enjoining professional people to display personal integrity. Yet in the economics curricula 
of the late twentieth century truth-telling as a matter of principle had long been assumed out of 
existence.    
5 Restoring Trust in Finance 
In this section we make a number of proposals for the restoration of trust in the finance industry. 





ways to ‘transform’ finance so that it is more ethical that other professions, or more ethical than 
it ever was, but we are setting ourselves a more modest goal.  
With regards to our specific contribution, if our motivation-crowding-out critique of financial 
incentives and economics training is correct, then it follows that the restoration of trust would 
be aided by less reliance on incentive contracts in the workplace, and, by discouraging the use 
of cost-benefit analyses for matters of integrity, as Jensen (2014) implies. This implies training 
participants in the finance industry to think in terms of moral prioritization rather than moral 
optimization.  
The change could be assisted by altering some professional norms in the workplace. It could 
also be aided by altering economics training in such a way that students are exposed to 
representative agents that are different to Economic Man, who optimizes over everything. A 
good start would be some exposure to the Reasonable Person of tort law, who is defined ‘in 
terms of the interests of oneself in relationship to society’s interests and the interests of others 
in that society’ (Lydenberg 2014, pg. 288). Depending on how pluralistic a classroom is, one 
could also consider feminist or religious perspectives (Tronto 2013, or Menzies and Hay 2012). 
Another step would be to teach agency theory differently, bringing Jensen (2014) into 
conversation with Jensen and Meckling (1976), much along the lines of section 3 above.  
One thing we have reason to doubt is that the ethical challenges we have discussed can be 
solved by further general deregulation. It is an appealing idea that firms that behave unethically 
will be driven out of a competitive market, and this may be true for sellers trying to sell rotten 
apples in a fruit market. However, the proverbial rotten apples of finance were not discovered 
during deregulation episodes in many economies during the late twentieth century, which gives 
us pause. Appendix 2 discusses why deregulation is unlikely to be effective at punishing 
unethical behaviour in finance. With respect to lying, the informational asymmetries are at least 
one problem – financial products and disclosures (to customers and shareholders) are complex, 
making it is hard to detect deceit.  
Nor are we proposing a general clamp down on finance, greatly reducing its size and 
profitability, by a general re-regulation. Since we have claimed financial incentives are 
overused and that economics training could be altered at the margin, we think a more judicious 
path is to attempt these reforms before embarking upon such a course of action. Of course, this 
does not take away the social choice (which exists in many industries) between having a 
dynamic and yet destructive environment versus a stable and staid one, but that is not the choice 





We close with some general comments which, while not original, could be relevant for 
policymakers who wish to restore trust in finance.  
We earlier noted the work on lying aversion by Erat and Gneezy (2010), which saw fully one 
third of subjects decline to tell a Pareto White Lie. Evidence like this might go some way to 
explaining why many profession associations take the risk of enjoining their members to tell 
the truth, rather than relying on Jensen and Meckling’s contracts. It also lends plausibility to 
the hope that finance might be expected to rise to the standards of these other professions.  
Economists who are otherwise uncomfortable with moral philosophy might like to draw on 
Adam Smith (1759) to justify moral prioritization. He believed that moral obligations arise out 
of a fellow feeling for the community in which one lives; his ‘impartial spectator’ was devised 
as an attempt to show how an individual comes to understand what these obligations might be, 
and might change his or her actions as a result (Wight 2015). Smith’s interest in the possible 
conflict between moral obligations and economic motivation was typical of his time, as was 
his wide-ranging consideration of the relevant issues (Oslington 2012). As discussed by Collard 
(1978, pg. 51 ff.) foundational modern thinkers such as Butler, Hume, Mill and Edgeworth all 
recognized a tendency not to count others’ welfare as much as one ought to for the flourishing 
of society, except in enlightened moments of ‘conscience’, ‘calm judgement’ or ‘calm 
moments’.  
Another source of moral obligations which might underpin moral prioritization is deontological 
ethical theory. Deontology seeks good rules of action, such as the Kantian Categorical 
Imperative to ‘act only in accordance with that maxim through which you can at the same time 
will that it become a universal law’, or its corollary that people should never be treated merely 
as a means to an end (Kant 1785). Bowie (2017) pursues the argument that a consistent and 
generalized application of Kantian principles in Business could constitute a form of 
trustworthiness.   
Alongside Kant’s search for universal principles, there is a need for more ‘local’ rules that do 
not have to meet Kant’s requirement of being applicable everywhere. In a work context, such 
local rules often constitute professional codes of conduct, though professionalism is about more 
than rules. Positively, the professional is enjoined to exhibit what Downie calls beneficence, 
which includes truth-telling and loyalty (Downie 1990, Gold and Miller 2016). 
Professionalization has arisen in occupations where there is reliance on judgment, which in 





professional difficult; and where what is offered in the transaction has a critical practical value, 
not being easily replaceable. In law, what is of critical practical value is one’s freedom; at 
school, education; in medicine, health. As these examples show, there are numerous other 
workplaces that maintain standards of professionalism, and where practitioners are not 
expected to exploit informational or monopoly power at the cost of those whom they serve.  
On a practical level there are a number of ways that professionalization functions. The most 
obvious is through a professional body’s self-certification of its members. Professionalization 
in finance would involve an examination of pay structures, to return to the motivation 
crowding out point made earlier.  
The foregoing suggestions are not radical, but neither are they straightforward to implement. 
Restoring trust and trustworthiness cannot be achieved by institutional reforms unless they are 
accompanied by a change in outlook. In particular, the keeping of rules – either general Kantian 
rules or professional codes of conduct – will safeguard the system only to the extent that 
bankers desire to be ethical.  
 
There are at least two barriers that stand in the way of this change in outlook.  
 
First, there is an apparent ‘moral boundary’ between work and home in Cohn et al. (2014). The 
bankers who lied did so when primed to think about work, but not about home.  This 
discrepancy is a pivotal interest for the Ethics of Care research program (Tronto 2013), which 
wants to ‘deconstruct’ the moral boundary between home and work, allowing care (defined in 
some detail by Tronto (2013)) to cross over from the former to the latter. Walzer (1983) 
explores the meanings of care that should apply to home and to the workplace.  
The second barrier standing in the way of a changed outlook is that the motivational power of 
money may not be fully understood. Money priming has suffered recently at the hands of the 
replication crisis, but we would caution against completely abandoning this kind of research. 
Indeed, the ‘sacred’ meaning attached to money in sociology echoes a pre-modern tradition 
which cautions against the motivational dangers of money (Heilbroner 2000). The influential 
example of Augustine (426) is analysed by Cameron (2011). Augustine’s model of ethics 
asserts the interplay of emotions and intellect. He conjectured that our understanding of the 
world is determined by our ‘loves’, which can include things as well as people. In the absence 
of a correct ‘ordering of loves’ a person can be obsessed by something so that ‘it fills the 





see is scarcity’ (Cameron 2011, pg. 53). Augustine sees money as having a personality, which 
can be served and loved. 15 According to this view, restoring trust in finance is as much about 
‘ordering of loves’ as it is about good rules. Writing in this tradition, Welby (2013) says rules 
in finance have limited usefulness if people do not desire the social goods that the rules are 
designed to foster. 
 
To conclude, we have argued that finance may have over-used incentive contracts, and we 
agree with Jensen (2014) that many finance professionals have received a very particular 
ethical training that uses crude cost-benefit analysis for ethics. It is difficult to imagine restoring 
trust in bankers while ever their workplace culture applies cost benefit analysis to all moral 
decisions, for moral optimization will always prescribe an optimal amount of a ‘bad’ like 
deceit. We argued that sometimes it is better if a worthwhile principle overrides utility- or 
profit-maximization. We called this moral prioritization and discussed how to reinstate it in 
finance.  
While it is easy to make claims with hindsight, economists (and society generally) may have 
been too optimistic about Adam Smith’s invisible hand operating in the financial system, and 
too reluctant to ask financial market participants to tell the truth with the same frequency as 
other professions. Perfection is unattainable, but nevertheless society can and should expect 
more principled behaviour from more principled agents. 
Appendix 1: Finance Was More Trustworthy in the Past 
Cohn et al. (2014) does not explain the lack of truth-telling by bankers – it only establishes its 
existence and correlates it with their workplace. But the natural question which arises is 
whether this has always been the case and, if not, what might have caused the change. Our 
reading of the evidence is that the untrustworthiness observed in Cohn et al. (2014) is 
contingent and recent. In coming to this view, we rely on the well-documented and well-
accepted narrative of the transformation of The City (of London) financial centre from a 
service-orientated profession to a workplace for egoistic profit maximizers.  
 
We first tell the story historically, based on secondary sources,16 and at the end of this appendix 
we tell the story analytically, using a modified version of Bowles’s (2011) stylized 
                                                          
15 Augustine draws on the New Testament, which is responsible for the famous saying ‘For the love of money is 
a root of all kinds of evil’ (Paul, in Timothy 6:10). This is often misquoted as the less defensible ‘money is the 
root of all evil’ most famously by Ayn Rand in her (1957) defence of markets in the novel Atlas Shrugged. 





evolutionary-game theory diagram of institutional and cultural change. We describe a 
‘non-virtuous circle’ whereby increased offering of incentive contracts erodes virtue, requiring 
that more incentive contracts be offered, and so on. 
 
For most of the 20th Century British banking was not marked by adventurous attitudes to risk 
and truthfulness. During the post-war construction of the British welfare state, financial 
markets were strictly regulated and international movements of financial capital were 
limited. The financial sector was highly fragmented, with participants being vetted to ensure 
they were deemed ‘fit and proper’ to carry out their functions. Individuals, firms, and 
partnerships not so deemed were dealt with by their peers and in extreme cases were excluded 
from the markets and from the social and professional networks of The City. This is the origin 
of the term ‘gentlemen bankers’, collectively referred to as the ‘Club’.  
The banking community at the time operated largely by self-regulatory agreement, with some 
legal underpinning. The only institutions which engaged in complex or risky transactions were 
the merchant/investment banks and other specialist brokers and traders. They too were careful 
as, given the partnership arrangements, they were taking risks mostly with their own funds. 
Investment bankers depended very much on their reputation, which had developed through 
long-term relationships with clients and other counterparties within The City.  Most banks had 
centralized, and demanding, inspection regimes which ensured that rules and procedures were 
strictly followed and clients were served well.  
Growth and consolidation in British banking occurred over the latter half of the twentieth 
century spurred by general financial deregulation. At the so-called ‘Big Bang’ in 1986, fixed 
commission charges were abolished and the Stock Exchange changed from open outcry to 
electronic trading. Previously separate financial organisations began to merge, and capital 
markets became dominated by global investment banks with large capital bases. Bankers struck 
profit-sharing bargains with their new shareholders, and a bonus-pay culture took hold.  
The arrival of overseas banks transformed and globalized the culture of The City. At least by 
2008, this global culture was not known for its truthfulness. US issuers and underwriters of 
mortgage-backed securities (MBSs), in a violation of fiduciary duties to both shareholders and 
customers, misled shareholders about their own MBS holdings and bet against these assets 
even as they sold them to trusted clients.  Most of the largest mortgage originators and 
mortgage-backed securities issuers and underwriters have been involved in regulatory 





court cases since 2008 are testimony to the global contagion that was underway. Barclays and 
four former executives have recently been charged with fraud in 2008 (The Economist 2017) 
and Payment Protection Insurance (PPI) mis-selling was a growing problem from the 
mid-1990s.17 A very large number of those policies were sold to clients who did not ask for 
them, did not understand them, or did not know that they would be unable to claim against 
them. By the time the fraud was uncovered, and the High Court ruled against the practice in 
2011, it had become ‘systemic’ in the financial system (HoLC 2013).  
The arrival of global banking culture to Australia came a bit later, but according to Hogan 
(2018, quoted in body of the paper) the new culture became obsessed entirely with short term 
financial gain, and was partly responsible for the abuses uncovered by the 2017-2019 
Australian Royal Commission into Misconduct in the Banking, Superannuation and Financial 
Services Industry.  
Returning to the UK narrative, the globalization of banking culture in The City was often 
accompanied by the formation of a ‘markets division’, managed by people who began their 
careers as traders. These individuals came to dominate the boards, management committees 
and culture of their banks. Their high levels of pay led to a corresponding surge in the pay of 
other bank board members, which could be justified only by raising shareholder expectations 
of returns. Higher returns were achieved by increasing the levels of leverage and risk (Jaffer et 
al. 2014). Even those who did not receive bonus-based pay packages began to inhabit a banking 
culture generated by those who did. The bonus culture saw an evacuation of ethical 
motivations, which in turn required that people be motivated increasingly by financial 
incentives.  The possible ways in which bonuses accomplish this are discussed in the main text.  
Difficulties in making competition work in finance (discussed in appendix 2) meant that any 
misbehaving bankers were not driven out of the market. Rather, they began to drive its values, 
treating customers and shareholders in ways that would have been unacceptable during the era 
of the Club.  
Financial products were increasingly sold on a caveat emptor (let the buyer beware) basis, and 
bankers maximized rents arising from market power and informational asymmetries (Woolley 
2010). The simplest way to exploit the latter is by not disclosing to clients low probability but 
                                                          
17 PPI is an insurance facility that Banks and Building Societies sell to borrowers to protect them against the 





damaging (‘tail’) risks. With regards to shareholders, informational asymmetries allowed 
bankers to mislead shareholders (and clients) about the worth of their management services.  
Over this period, the general view is that the conservative virtues of probity and truthfulness 
that had characterised banking culture were replaced by the pursuit of personal gain (Jaffer et 
al. 2014, Martin 2016 and Offer 2014). The Club had been based on delivering a service, but 
participants in the global banking culture that replaced the Club trained themselves to mislead 
customers and shareholders. Turner (2010) and Kolb (2010) catalogues the well-known 
unravelling of the system in 2008.  
We are aware in the foregoing account there is a two-way causality between motivation 
crowding out and incentive contracts. On the one hand, banker bonuses crowded out good 
motives, but on the other hand if agents have poor motives it is natural to motivate them with 
high-powered incentive contracts (as this is likely to be the only motivation that will work).  
An empirical modelling of this process is beyond the scope of this paper, and the prospects for 
a non-experimental investigation are probably poor, since attenuating virtue among agents is 
something they are likely to hide. (Cohn et al. 2014 succeed in uncovering it, but most 
experiments are a somewhat contrived environment). As an alternative, we describe this 
negative feedback loop using an adaptation of Bowles’s (2011) stylized evolutionary-game 
theory diagram of institutional and cultural change. His original diagrams (labelled A to D) are 
reproduced below, with the addition of phase arrows.  
.  
Suppose a bank (principal) assigns a group of agents to be managers, whose type (trustworthy 
or untrustworthy) is known to the bank.  
We let Bowles’s virtue (v) be the number of truth-telling managers and we let the extent of 





designed to function in an economy inhabited by Economic Man, Principal-Agent incentive 
contracts are designed to function in a firm inhabited by untrustworthy managers.  
Panel A, the Crowding Out diagram, is downward sloping because offering incentive contracts 
communicates that the bank doesn’t trust managers. The phase arrows (which are implied but 
not drawn in Bowles’s original diagram) indicate how truth-telling by managers drifts to this 
‘message’ of distrust if it is off the line. The second term of v(m; (m-)) shifts the whole curve 
down for a decline in Bowles’s ‘tradition’ variable (m-), which depends on all previous values 
of m. We interpret tradition as agents’ use of moral prioritization rather than moral 
optimization. In Bowles’s framework a decline occurs with an unspecified time lag, as the 
number of incentive contracts rises (though we make the effect instant when we use 
mathematics below). A maximizing untruthful agent faced with a fixed wage contract declares 
untruthfully that they have put in contracted effort and then blames any resultant low revenue 
on bad luck, making the offer of such a contract sub-optimal for the bank (who we assume still 
pays the agent). We might imagine cultural decline occurring when the number of incentive 
contracts based on Jensen and Meckling (1976) become so high that employees decide to read 
the original article, and then revert to their business school training Jensen (2014) that moral 
optimization is ‘correct’. 
Coming to Panel B, the Markets Economize on Virtue diagram, this is the number of incentive 
contracts a profit maximizing bank should offer given that it knows the type of the agent. When 
truth-telling is common only a few managers need incentive contracts but as more agents 
abandon truth-telling, more contracts have to be offered. The phase arrows indicate that if more 
than the minimum number are offered, the bank can be more efficient by replacing some 
contracts with fixed wage contracts, since they can rely on moral prioritization for the 
trustworthy agents, and that if too few are offered they have to increase the number since the 
fixed wage contract will be exploited by every untruthful agent.  
The intersection of the Crowding Out and Markets Economize on Virtue lines forms what 






A negative feedback loop – what we call a non-virtuous circle – could be set off by any 
exogenous decline in the Crowding Out schedule, such as the influence of global banking 
culture described in Hogan (2018).  
In terms of our stylized model, such a change in culture shifts down the Crowding Out schedule. 
That is, for a given number of incentive contracts fewer managers are truthful. On the path to 
point b in Panel D below, there is first of all a decline in the number of truthful managers. This 
requires the bank to offer more incentive contracts, leading to some more managers becoming 
untrustworthy via the ‘banks don’t trust managers’ message, until point b becomes the new 
temporary cultural-institutional equilibrium with more incentive contracts and fewer 
truth-tellers than point a.  
 
However, over time, the increased salience of incentive contracts, as they become more 





endogenously eroding whatever workplace culture of truth-telling remains. The Crowding Out 
curve drops to point c, and so on – creating the non-virtuous circle. 
We can summarize Bowles’s point by relabelling m(v) and v(m, (m-)) as MEV(m) and 
CO(m, {(m)-e}) where MEV and CO stand for ‘markets economize on virtue’ and motivation 
‘crowding out’, and we allow for the worst-case-scenario of an instant impact of m on tradition, 
as well as a shifter e which hurts tradition, such as the influence of global banking culture 
described in Hogan (2018). Taking the total derivative at the equilibrium MEV=CO: 
𝑑𝑀𝐸𝑉 = 𝑑𝐶𝑂 





{𝐶𝑂𝑚 − 𝑀𝐸𝑉𝑚}+ 𝐶𝑂𝜏𝜏𝑚
> 0. 
The denominator is positive for sufficiently large 𝐶𝑂𝑚 − 𝑀𝐸𝑉𝑚 which corresponds to a 
stability condition for the model. Thus an exogenous decline in Bowles’s motivation crowding 
out function (via the shifter e above) will lead to a further uptake of incentive contracts, both 
because of necessity (moving down along the markets economize on virtue line m(v)) but also 
because the extra salience of contracts will over time encourage people to alter their moral 
frame (like the parents in Gneezy and Rustichini (2000)), leading to a shift down in the whole 
motivation crowding out schedule v(.) via an erosion of tradition (), as moral prioritization is 
abandoned in favour of moral optimization.  
This is our so-called non-virtuous circle. A lack of trust becomes self-fulfilling as in the 
aforementioned phenomenon of ‘trust responsiveness’ (Bacharach et al. 2007) whereby the 
communication of a lack of trust from party A to party B leads to party B actually becoming 
less trustworthy. But in the non-virtuous circle, the fact that party B becomes less trustworthy 
additionally requires party A to motivate her with an incentive contract which, while it may 
function well as an incentive, introduces another round of negative (mis)trust responsiveness, 
and so on.  
Appendix 2: Competition is Unlikely to Drive Out Bad Ethical Behaviour in Finance 
Our first concern about competition is that deregulation in finance will not necessarily destroy 
poorly performing firms. As was amply demonstrated in 2008, risks associated with bank 
failure are so large that the authorities cannot afford to let some poorly performing firms go 





public money, but some managers exited with substantial bonuses, leaving them free to 
mismanage again.  
 
There has been an international regulatory response, not least in the form of Basel III. It has 
sought to strengthen incentives for good behaviour, protect depositors by increasing the 
quantity and quality of capital, enhance liquidity provision and introduce macroprudential 
policy. In the UK, ‘ring-fencing’ and ‘bailing in’ are discussed in the Vickers Report on the UK 
banking system (Edmonds 2013), and the intention of both is to hold high risk takers to account.  
 
Nevertheless, recessions compounded by financial sector crises are deeper and longer than other 
recessions. Figure 4 (IMF 2009) shows these features averaged over worldwide financial sector 
recessions, and we note particularly that easier monetary policy is generally pursued. This 
means that even in scenarios where some errant banks fail without endangering the public purse, 
the likely easing of monetary policy during a financial crisis will protect some other errant 
banks. If errant firms exhibit unethical behaviour more than other firms, then competition policy 
is a poor tool for encouraging an ethical financial system.  
Figure 4: Financial Sector Recessions are More Severe 
(IMF calculations, quarters since peak in real output) 
 
(IMF 2009, Figure 3.8, pg. 118) 
 
 
Our second concern about competition is that it is very difficult for customers and shareholders 
to monitor banks, and accountability is a very important component of market discipline. The 
fundamental problem here is conceptual. Whatever accounting conventions are used, there is 
significant uncertainty about the measurement of risk, and this makes it difficult to adjust 
accounting profits for risk. Haldane et al. (2011) propose that this should be a priority in any 






‘As it is rudimentary to its activities, finding a more sophisticated approach to 
measuring risk, as well as return, within the financial sector would seem to be a 
priority. The conflation of the two can lead to an overstatement of banks’ contribution 
to the economy and an understatement of the true risk facing banks and the economy 
at large.’   (Op. cit. pg. 106) 
 
Financial firms are in a position to conduct trades with a zero, or even negative, expected return 
which are nonetheless extremely profitable in the short term (Wolf 2010). They may undertake 
large-volume trades each with a high probability of a small gain and a small probability of a 
huge loss. The dangers are illustrated by Noe and Peyton Young (2014). They show how a 
manager can use derivatives to increase returns by generating extreme tail risk for the client. In 
normal times the client makes a good return and the manager gets a good bonus. However, 
during a tail event the investor loses everything, but the fund manager merely fails to get his or 
her bonus.  
 
Any conflation of risk and return in measurement allow bankers to lie to ill-informed 
shareholders and customers about the risks of particular strategies. Furthermore, these 
measurement problems may paint a picture of an institution able to withstand the inevitable 
‘bad draws’ of risk-taking, when in fact the institution is not sufficiently fortified.  
 
The upshot of all these information problems is that there is a significant degree of 
difficult-to-quantify risk built into the financial system, which allows bank managers to lie to 
shareholders and customers should they wish to do so. It remains to be seen if advances in 
measurement, such as those sought by Haldane et al. (2011), will solve these problems, but such 
a development would be welcome.  
Our third and final concern about competition policy is that attempts to reduce market power 
by encouraging new entrants may encourage risk taking and deception. Berger et al. (2009) 
suggest that new entrants are more likely to result in ‘competition fragility’ than to reap the 
benefits of the invisible hand. Competition fragility is the scenario where compressed bank 
margins  tempt banks to pursue zero or negative expected excess return strategies, which none 
the less look very profitable in the short run. That is, strategies like Noe and Peyton Young 
(2014) become even more likely in competitive environments. As we just noted, these strategies 
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